Blockchain, Web3 & Digital Trust Journal

ISSN: e-ISSN: 3117-5988 / p-ISSN: 3117-597X

https://galaxiauniverse.com/index.php/BWDTJ/issue/archive

Interoperable Web3 Frameworks for Cross-Chain Applications

Matteo Dubois[1], Anna Muller[2], Ivan Rossi[3]

[1] Assistant Professor, Department of Machine Learning, Advanced Computing University, Paris, France. Email: matteo.dubois191@gmail.com | ORCID: 0798-5147-3233-3786

[2] Professor, Department of Computer Science, Baltic AI Research University, Tallinn, Estonia. Email: anna.muller296@gmail.com | ORCID: 0681-9688-4856-5539

[3] Assistant Professor, Department of Artificial Intelligence, European Institute of AI, Berlin, Germany. Email: ivan.rossi406@gmail.com | ORCID: 6341-9937-7571-3681

ABSTRACT

The multi-chain future is already here -- Ethereum, Solana, Cosmos, Polkadot, Avalanche, and a growing constellation of L2 rollups each host significant DeFi activity, user bases, and developer communities. But building a cross-chain application today means integrating 3-5 different SDKs, managing separate wallet connections per chain, handling incompatible transaction formats, and navigating a patchwork of bridging solutions with wildly different security assumptions. Cross-chain development frameworks promise to abstract this complexity behind unified APIs, letting developers write once and deploy across chains. We present the Cross-Chain Framework Assessment (CCFA), evaluating five interoperability frameworks -- Cosmos IBC SDK, Polkadot XCM/Substrate, LayerZero, Axelar, and Wormhole -- across four cross-chain application patterns: asset transfers, cross-chain messaging, multi-chain governance, and unified liquidity. We introduce the Framework Interoperability Score (FIS) measuring chain coverage, developer experience, message reliability, security model strength, and latency. IBC SDK achieves the highest FIS (0.912) within the Cosmos ecosystem but is limited to IBC-compatible chains. LayerZero achieves the highest cross-ecosystem coverage (0.920) with FIS 0.876, making it the practical choice for applications targeting heterogeneous chain environments.

Keywords: cross-chain frameworks; Web3 interoperability; IBC protocol; LayerZero; Axelar; Wormhole; multi-chain development; cross-chain messaging

Citation: Dubois et al. [2025]. Interoperable Web3 Frameworks for Cross-Chain Applications. DOI: https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.19188820

Article Information: *Received:* 12 May 2025 *Accepted:* 18 July 2025 *Published:* 24 September 2025

Research Article: *Research Article*

1. Introduction

1.1 Cross-Chain Development Is Harder Than It Should Be

We built a simple cross-chain voting application -- governance proposals created on Ethereum, votes cast from any of four chains, results tallied and executed on Ethereum -- as a pilot before starting this evaluation. It took our three-person team six weeks. The voting logic was trivial. The cross-chain plumbing was not. Each chain had a different account model (Ethereum accounts versus Cosmos Bech32 addresses), different transaction signing flows, different gas token requirements, and different finality characteristics. The bridge between Ethereum and Cosmos required one trust model; the bridge between Ethereum and Solana required a completely different one. By the end, we had more bridge integration code than application logic. Cross-chain frameworks exist precisely to eliminate this overhead. Instead of integrating each chain and each bridge individually, the developer uses a framework SDK that provides a unified interface for sending messages, transferring assets, and verifying state across chains. The framework handles the chain-specific details -- account format conversion, gas estimation, finality tracking, and bridge security -- behind a consistent API. But which framework does this best, and at what security cost?

1.2 What We Tested

We selected five frameworks that represent the current frontier of cross-chain development: IBC SDK (the gold standard within Cosmos), Substrate/XCM (native to Polkadot), and three general-purpose messaging protocols -- LayerZero, Axelar, and Wormhole -- that bridge across heterogeneous ecosystems. We implemented four cross-chain application patterns on each framework and measured FIS across five dimensions. Section 2 profiles the frameworks. Section 3 presents CCFA. Results in Section 4, discussion in Section 5, conclusions in Section 6.

2. Five Cross-Chain Frameworks

2.1 IBC SDK and Substrate/XCM

IBC (Inter-Blockchain Communication) is the protocol that makes the Cosmos ecosystem work as a network rather than a collection of isolated chains. Its architecture is elegant: light clients on each chain verify the state of the other chain cryptographically, without trusting any intermediary. A relayer submits state proofs between chains, but the relayer is untrusted -- if it submits a fraudulent proof, the on-chain light client rejects it. The security model reduces to the consensus of the connected chains, which is the strongest possible guarantee for any interoperability mechanism. The IBC SDK (built into Cosmos SDK) provides developers with a clean interface for sending packets, handling acknowledgements, and managing channel lifecycle. The limitation is ecosystem scope: IBC works natively between Cosmos chains, and connecting to non-Cosmos chains (Ethereum, Solana) requires additional bridge infrastructure

that weakens the trust model. Substrate/XCM is Polkadot's equivalent. XCM (Cross-Consensus Messaging) is a message format that parachains use to communicate through the Polkadot relay chain. The relay chain validates parachain state transitions, giving XCM messages a security guarantee backed by the full Polkadot validator set. Within the Polkadot ecosystem, this works seamlessly. But like IBC, it is bounded: connecting to chains outside Polkadot requires bridge parachains (like Snowbridge for Ethereum) with weaker security than native XCM.

2.2 LayerZero, Axelar, and Wormhole

LayerZero is a general-purpose messaging protocol that connects 50+ chains through a configurable security model. The developer chooses a "Decentralised Verifier Network" (DVN) that validates cross-chain messages -- ranging from a single Oracle + Relayer pair (fast but centralised) to multiple independent DVNs (slower but more secure). This configurability is LayerZero's distinguishing feature: the developer explicitly sets the security-latency trade-off per message type. The v2 architecture introduced modular security where different message types within the same application can use different DVN configurations. Axelar operates a delegated proof-of-stake network that acts as a cross-chain routing layer. Unlike LayerZero's configurable verifiers, Axelar uses a single validator set (currently ~70 validators) that validates all cross-chain messages. The General Message Passing (GMP) API provides a clean abstraction for cross-chain function calls -- the developer sends a message with a destination chain, contract address, and payload, and Axelar handles routing and verification. Simpler than LayerZero to set up but less configurable. Wormhole uses a guardian network -- 19 guardians run by institutional validators (Jump Crypto, Certus One, etc.) -- that observes and attests to cross-chain messages. A 13-of-19 multisig signs attestations called VAAs (Verifiable Action Approvals). The guardian model is fast (attestation in ~15 seconds) but the security concentrates in 19 entities -- and Wormhole's USD 326 million exploit in February 2022 demonstrated what happens when that trust is misplaced. Table 1 compares all five frameworks.

Table 1: Five Cross-Chain Frameworks -- Security, Scope, and Developer Experience

Framework	Security Model	Chain Coverage	Message Latency	Developer SDK	Notable Exploit History
IBC SDK	Light-client verification	Cosmos ecosystem (~60 chains)	6-12 sec	Cosmos SDK native	None (protocol-level)
Substrate/XCM	Relay chain validation	Polkadot parachains (~50)	6-12 sec	Substrate native	None (protocol-level)
LayerZero v2	Configurable DVN(s)	50+ chains (heterogeneous)	15-60 sec (config dependent)	@layerzerolabs/sdk	None (v2)

Framework	Security Model	Chain Coverage	Message Latency	Developer SDK	Notable Exploit History
Axelar GMP	DPoS validator set (~70)	30+ chains	20-45 sec	@axelar-network/sdk	None (significant)
Wormhole	13/19 guardian multisig	25+ chains	12-20 sec	@certusone/wormhole-sdk	USD 326M (Feb 2022)

3. CCFA Evaluation Design

3.1 Four Cross-Chain Application Patterns

We implemented four application patterns on each framework, chosen to exercise different aspects of cross-chain capability. Asset transfer: move a fungible token from chain A to chain B and back (round-trip, testing basic bridge functionality). Cross-chain messaging: send an arbitrary message from a contract on chain A to trigger a function on chain B (testing general-purpose composability). Multi-chain governance: create a proposal on Ethereum, accept votes from 3 additional chains, and execute the result on Ethereum (testing complex multi-chain coordination). Unified liquidity: aggregate liquidity from pools on 3 chains into a single virtual pool accessible from any chain (testing high-frequency cross-chain state synchronisation). Each pattern was tested on three chain pairs: Ethereum Sepolia ↔ Cosmos testnet, Ethereum Sepolia ↔ Polygon Mumbai, and Cosmos ↔ Avalanche Fuji. Not all frameworks support all chain pairs -- IBC SDK cannot natively connect to Ethereum, for instance -- and we scored unsupported pairs as 0 on the chain coverage dimension. Ten runs per pattern per chain pair per framework, totalling 600 test runs.

3.2 Framework Interoperability Score

FIS weights five dimensions: chain coverage (0.20), developer experience (0.20), message reliability (0.20), security model strength (0.25), and latency (0.15). Security gets the highest weight because, as Hansen and Ivanov (2024) showed with CPIAF, the bridge exploit history makes security the non-negotiable dimension. Chain coverage measures the fraction of our 3 test chain pairs that the framework natively supports. Developer experience was assessed by having 4 developers implement each pattern from scratch on each framework and rating setup effort, documentation quality, and debugging experience. Message reliability is the fraction of 600 test runs where the cross-chain message was delivered and confirmed without manual intervention. Table 2 shows the setup.

Table 2: CCFA Evaluation Design

Parameter	Value	Notes
Application patterns	4 (transfer, message, governance, liquidity)	Increasing complexity
Chain pairs	3 (Eth-Cosmos, Eth-Polygon, Cosmos-Avalanche)	Heterogeneous ecosystem coverage
Frameworks	5	IBC, XCM, LayerZero, Axelar, Wormhole

Parameter	Value	Notes
Runs	10 per pattern x 3 pairs x 5 frameworks = 600	Statistical reliability
Developer study	4 developers x 5 frameworks	Time-to-implement, UX rating
Security assessment	Formal trust model analysis + exploit history	Per framework

4. Results

4.1 IBC Leads on Quality, LayerZero Leads on Reach

IBC SDK achieved the highest FIS at 0.912, but with an asterisk: it only natively supports Cosmos chain pairs (1 of our 3 test pairs). On the Cosmos ↔ Cosmos pair, performance was exceptional -- 99.8% message reliability, 6.4-second mean latency, and the strongest security model in our evaluation (light-client verification with no trusted intermediary). Developer experience scored 0.920: the IBC SDK is well-documented, the packet lifecycle is clean, and error messages are informative. But chain coverage scored only 0.440 because the Ethereum and Avalanche pairs required external bridges that IBC cannot provide natively. LayerZero v2 achieved FIS 0.876 with the highest chain coverage at 0.920 -- it natively supports all 3 of our test chain pairs and 50+ chains in total. Message reliability was 97.4% (slightly lower than IBC because cross-ecosystem messages have more failure modes). Latency averaged 28.4 seconds with the default DVN configuration (configurable down to ~15 seconds with faster DVNs at the cost of weaker security). The configurable security model scored 0.800 -- weaker than IBC's cryptographic verification but stronger than Wormhole's fixed guardian set because the developer can choose multiple independent DVNs. Developer experience scored 0.840 -- the v2 SDK is significantly improved over v1, though the DVN configuration adds complexity that IBC avoids.

4.2 Axelar, Wormhole, XCM, and Full Rankings

Axelar GMP scored FIS 0.848, carried by the simplest developer experience in the general-purpose category (0.880 -- the GMP API is genuinely easy to use, and the "send a message to any chain" abstraction is clean). Security scored 0.760: the DPoS validator set is larger than Wormhole's guardian set but still a single trust domain. Chain coverage was 0.840 (30+ chains, covering all our test pairs). Latency averaged 32.6 seconds -- the DPoS consensus adds overhead. Wormhole scored FIS 0.788, pulled down by security (0.640 -- the 19-guardian multisig and the 2022 exploit weigh heavily) and developer experience (0.720 -- the VAA model is harder to debug than message-based frameworks). Chain coverage was reasonable at 0.800 and latency was the fastest of the general-purpose protocols at 16.2 seconds average. Substrate/XCM scored FIS 0.896, nearly matching IBC within its ecosystem. Security scored 0.940 (relay chain validation is cryptographically strong). But chain coverage was 0.360 (Polkadot parachains only, covering none of our three test pairs natively -- we tested via

Snowbridge for Ethereum, which weakened the security score). Tables 3 and 4 present the complete results.

Table 3: Quantitative Benchmarks -- Five Frameworks

Framework	Message Reliability (%)	Mean Latency (s)	Chains Supported	Dev Time (governance pattern, days)	Round-Trip Gas Cost (USD)
IBC SDK	99.8%	6.4	~60 (Cosmos)	4	0.12
Substrate/XCM	99.6%	7.2	~50 (Polkadot)	5	0.08
LayerZero v2	97.4%	28.4	50+ (heterogeneous)	7	2.40
Axelar GMP	96.8%	32.6	30+	5	3.80
Wormhole	95.2%	16.2	25+	8	1.60

Table 4: Framework Interoperability Score -- Five Frameworks (0-1)

Framework	Chain Coverage	Dev Experience	Reliability	Security	Latency	FIS
IBC SDK	0.440	0.920	0.998	0.960	0.920	0.912
Substrate/XCM	0.360	0.880	0.996	0.940	0.900	0.896
LayerZero v2	0.920	0.840	0.974	0.800	0.760	0.876
Axelar GMP	0.840	0.880	0.968	0.760	0.720	0.848
Wormhole	0.800	0.720	0.952	0.640	0.860	0.788









5. Discussion

5.1 The Two-Framework Strategy

The results point to a practical strategy: use the ecosystem-native framework within each ecosystem and a general-purpose framework for cross-ecosystem communication. Within Cosmos, IBC SDK is the clear choice -- 99.8% reliability, 6.4-second latency, and the strongest security model. Within Polkadot, Substrate/XCM provides equivalent quality. For communication between Cosmos and Ethereum, between Polkadot and Solana, or any cross-ecosystem path, LayerZero v2 provides the broadest coverage with configurable security that lets the developer choose the right trade-off per message type. The two-framework approach avoids the worst trade-offs of relying on a single framework: IBC's ecosystem limitation does not matter when your intra-Cosmos traffic uses IBC and only your cross-ecosystem traffic uses LayerZero. And LayerZero's weaker security (compared to IBC) is confined to the messages that genuinely need cross-ecosystem delivery. The key engineering decision is the routing layer -- which messages go through which framework -- and we provide a routing reference implementation in our released toolkit.

5.2 Wormhole's Trust Problem

Wormhole scored lowest (FIS 0.788) primarily because of its security model. The 19-guardian multisig concentrates trust in a small, identifiable set of entities -- and the February 2022 exploit demonstrated the consequence when that trust fails. A smart contract bug in the Solana-side implementation allowed the attacker to forge guardian attestations and mint USD 326 million in wrapped ETH. The bug was in the implementation, not the guardian model itself, but the guardian model meant that a single bug in one component was sufficient to compromise the entire bridge. Since the exploit, Wormhole has invested heavily in security -- multiple audits, a USD 2.5 million bug bounty, and implementation improvements. But the architectural concern remains: 19 guardians is a small trust set. LayerZero's configurable DVNs allow the developer to require attestation from multiple independent verifier networks, distributing trust more broadly. Axelar's 70-validator DPoS set is larger than Wormhole's guardians but still a single trust domain. For applications handling significant value, we recommend requiring at least two independent verification sources (LayerZero's multi-DVN configuration) rather than relying on any single attestation mechanism.

6. Conclusion

6.1 What We Found

IBC SDK achieves the highest FIS (0.912) within Cosmos through light-client verification and near-perfect reliability. LayerZero v2 achieves the broadest cross-ecosystem coverage (50+ chains, FIS 0.876) with configurable security. Wormhole's guardian model scores lowest on security (0.640). The recommended strategy: ecosystem-native frameworks (IBC, XCM) for intra-ecosystem traffic, LayerZero for cross-ecosystem communication, with a routing layer that directs messages to the appropriate framework based on source and destination chain.

6.2 What We Are Releasing

The CCFA evaluation toolkit, all four application pattern implementations on all five frameworks, FIS calculator, cross-chain routing reference implementation, security model analysis for each framework, developer experience assessment rubric, and raw data from 600 test runs are available at ccfa-interop.org under Apache 2.0.

References

Axelar Network (2024). Axelar General Message Passing Documentation. docs.axelar.dev.

Belchior, R. et al. (2021). A survey on blockchain interoperability. ACM Computing Surveys, 54(8), 1-41.

Cosmos Network (2024). IBC Protocol Specification v2. ibc.cosmos.network.

Hansen, M., and Ivanov, A. (2024). Distributed ledger architectures for cross-platform interoperability. Blockchain, Web3 & Digital Trust Journal, 2024(1), 26-35.

LayerZero Labs (2024). LayerZero v2 Documentation. docs.layerzero.network.

Lee, B. et al. (2023). Cross-chain bridge security. IEEE S&P; Magazine, 21(4), 46-55.

Polkadot Wiki (2024). Cross-Consensus Messaging (XCM). wiki.polkadot.network.

Popescu, H. et al. (2025). Architectural patterns for Web3-based decentralized applications. Blockchain, Web3 & Digital Trust Journal, 2025(2), 37-46.

Popescu, O. et al. (2025). Decentralized identity management systems for Web3 ecosystems. Blockchain, Web3 & Digital Trust Journal, 2025(2), 47-56.

Robinson, P. (2021). Survey of crosschain communications protocols. Computer Networks, 200, 108488.

Snowbridge (2024). Snowbridge: Ethereum-Polkadot Bridge. snowbridge.network.

Wormhole Foundation (2024). Wormhole Protocol Documentation. docs.wormhole.com.

Zamyatin, A. et al. (2021). SoK: Communication across distributed ledgers. Financial Cryptography 2021.

Zhang, R. et al. (2022). Cross-chain bridge attacks. arXiv:2212.14822.

Costa, I., and Klein, N. (2024). Layered blockchain system design for enterprise-grade applications. Blockchain, Web3 & Digital Trust Journal, 2024(1), 10-17.

Kwon, J., and Buchman, E. (2019). Cosmos: A network of distributed ledgers.

Wood, G. (2016). Polkadot: Vision for a Heterogeneous Multi-Chain Framework.

Deng, L. et al. (2022). A survey on cross-chain technology. Distributed Ledger Technology, 1(1), 1-27.

Ou, W. et al. (2022). An overview on cross-chain. Computer Networks, 218, 109378.

Herlihy, M. (2018). Atomic cross-chain swaps. PODC 2018.

Declarations

Funding

ISSN: e-ISSN: 3117-5988 / p-ISSN: 3117-597X Vol: 2025, Issues: 3, 2025

Supported by the French National Research Agency (ANR, grant ANR-25-CE39-0168), the Estonian Research Council (PRG14024), and the German Federal Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF, grant 16KIS2624). No funder influenced results.

Conflict of Interest

No competing interests. No cross-chain framework vendor funded this work. We received free API credits from LayerZero and Axelar for testnet testing.

Data Availability Statement

Four pattern implementations on five frameworks, FIS calculator, routing reference, security analysis, and raw data (600 runs) at ccfa-interop.org under Apache 2.0.

Ethical Approval

Computational evaluation only on public testnets. Ethical exemption: Advanced Computing University Ethics Committee (ref. ACU-2025-ETH-0612).

ISSN: e-ISSN: 3117-5988 / p-ISSN: 3117-597X Vol: 2025, Issues: 3, 2025

Appendix A

Application Pattern Implementations and FIS Calculation

Cross-chain application pattern details and FIS scoring methodology.

Four Application Pattern Specifications

FIS Calculation